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and The Genealogy of Morals 
Gary Shapiro 
Two cautions or warnings (at least) must be heeded in the attempt to 
do justice to Nietzsche's project of a genealogy of morals in the text 
that bears that name. While the Genealogy is often regarded as the 
most straightforward and continuous of Nietzsche's books, he tells us 
in Ecce Hmno that its three essays are "perhaps uncannier than 
anything else written so far in regard to expression, intention, and the 
art of surprise."1 If we should think ourselves successful in penetrating 
to these uncanny secrets and saying what Nietzsche's text means, 
once and for all, we would then have to read again its lapidary 
although parenthetical injunction that "only that which has no 
history can be defined." For since the work of Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkeimer, Jurgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, 
and Gilles Deleuze, genealogy has become a polemical word. When 
Nietzsche published the Genealogy in 1887, the main uses of the term 
arguably had to do with the ascertaining of actual family lineages to 
determine rights to titles, honors, and inheritances, as in the venerable 
Almanach of Gotha, and a careless librarian today might classify the 
book among those many middle-class popularizations which might all 
go under the title "Tracing Your Family Tree for Fun and Profit." But 
Foucault characterizes his History of Sexuality as a genealogy of the 
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modern self, and Derrida describes a large part of his intellectual 
project as "repeating the genealogy of morals"; Nietzsche's practice 
and example are invoked in both cases. 
How, then, might we proceed to assess the significance of Nie-
tzsche's "genealogy" in relation both to its mundane cousins and to 
those who have been drawing on his inheritance? I propose only a 
partial, critical, and bifocal effort in that direction, consisting in a 
reading of a few paradigmatic readings of Nietzschean genealogy. Let 
me begin with the interpretation of Jurgen Habermas, who assimilates 
Nietzsche's project to the aristocratic attempt to demonstrate the 
superiority of the most ancient and archaic. According to Habermas, 
Nietzsche's rejection of all rational and critical criteria for assessing 
values leaves him no other option: 
Once the critical sense of saying "No" is suspended and the pro-
cedure of negation is rendered impotent, Nietzsche goes back to 
the very dimension of the myth of origins that permits a distinc-
tion which affects all other dimensions: What is older is earlier in 
the generational chain and nearer to the origin. The more 
primordial is considered the more worthy of honor, the prefer-
able, the more unspoiled, the purer: It is deemed better. Deriva-
tion and descent serve as the criteria of rank, in both the social 
and the logical senses. 
In this manner, Nietzsche bases his critique of morality on 
geneaf,ogy. He traces the moral appraisal of value, which assigns 
a person or a mode of action a place within a rank ordering 
based on criteria of validity, back to the descent and hence to the 
social rank of the one making the moraljudgment.2 
This may be the genealogical scheme of values of the Almanach of 
Gotha, but it is not Nietzsche's. Despite his frequent bursts of admira-
tion for the "blond beasts" (lions) of early cultures, Nietzsche's narra-
tive never returns us to a point at which one single, pure form of 
morality obtains. Contrary both to the efforts of theological ethics and 
to the hypotheses of the English utilitarian historians of morality, The 
Geneaf,ogy of Morals insists that there is no single origin but only op-
position and diversity no matter how far back we go. There are, always 
already, at least two languages of morality, the aristocratic language 
of"good and bad" and the slavish language of"good and evil."Where a 
Platonist would focus on the fact that "good" appears in both dis-
courses and would search for its common meaning, Nietzsche notes 
that it is only the word shared by the two languages. One says "good" 















